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Environmental Performance Auditing of 
Government – the Role for an Australian 
Commissioner for the Environment 
GREGORY ROSE 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong  
 
Commonwealth performance in environmental management can be systematically assessed and reviewed 
through public sector environmental audits. Australia’s experiences in public sector environmental audit 
indicate that its difficulties lie in inadequate available baseline data and vague policy benchmarks. 
Significant governmental efforts are being made to address the national data problem but not the 
benchmarks. Recent trends towards more systematic government performance reporting may eventually 
feed back to improve benchmarks. Some urge the establishment of an Australian Commissioner for the 
Environment to implement performance reporting, amongst other tasks. The potential role of the 
Commissioner as national auditor in particular is examined, drawing largely on Canadian experience.  
 
There is so much governmental effort wasted in 
penning placebo policies on the environment! Why 
would anyone want to waste more effort in a further 
paper chase, auditing follow up? Yet, given careful 
attention, these wasting, dusty policy commitments 
might have useful lives. Performance audits are 
essential to ensure their vitality.  
Current practice and possibilities for auditing 
performance of environmental commitments by the 
Commonwealth government in Australia are 
explored in this article. Whether the task of public 
environmental performance auditing should be 
mandated to a new public office, such as a 
Commissioner for the Environment, or to an 
existing office, such as the Australian National 
Audit Office, is considered. The object is to inform 
aspects of the current debate concerning 
establishment of a Commonwealth Commissioner 
for the Environment. 
Defining environmental performance 
audit 
Environmental auditing emerged as a named 
activity in the 1970s. It was widely taken up by 
companies in the 1980s due to a number of factors: 
the increasing requirements of, and penalties 
associated with, governmental environmental 
regulation; the need to manage civil liability risk; 
the opportunities to increase efficiency gains 
through improved internal management systems; 
and the need for better public relations management 
as corporate environmental performance came 
under increasing public scrutiny. These trends 
continue to promote the use of environmental audit 
today and environmental audit is still primarily a 
private sector activity.1 
The International Standards Organisation defines 
an environmental audit as  
“a systematic, documented verification process 
of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence 
to determine whether specific environmental 
activities, events, conditions, management 
systems, or information about these matters 
conform with audit criteria, and communicating 
the results of this process to the client”.2  
 
* The author thanks those who gave freely of their time and 
knowledge in interviews for this article. 
1 Gregory P Johnson, The ISO 14000 EMS Audit Handbook  
(St Lucie Press, Boca Raton, USA 1997), p 2.  
2 ISO 14010, s 3.9. The International Chamber of Commerce 
definition of environmental auditing, which is widely accepted 
by industry, addresses essentially private sector activity and is 
less suited to public sector auditing is: a management tool 
comprising a systematic, documented, periodic and objective 
evaluation of how well environmental organisation, management 
and equipment are performing with the aim of helping to 
safeguard the environment by: facilitating management control of 
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This definition connotes different activities in 
distinct circumstances. It covers, for example, a 
one-off project assessment, such as management of 
sediment dredging in a port development, or 
ongoing systematic review of organisational 
performance, for example of internal management 
of energy efficiency.3 Thus, because the spectrum of 
activities described as “environmental auditing” is 
broad, the term is often used loosely. To avoid 
confusion it is necessary to distinguish the 
fragmented meanings of the term and to identify 
exactly which environmental audit approaches and 
methodologies are the appropriate subject of 
consideration in public sector auditing of its own 
environmental performance.  
Legal compliance, due diligence and 
performance audits distinguished 
Common criteria for environmental audits in the 
private sector are legal compliance and exercise of 
due diligence. Compliance auditing determines 
whether an organisation is operating in compliance 
with all relevant legal obligations, usually set out in 
legislation and regulations. Typically, compliance 
audits identify specific problems of non-compliance 
with environmental regulations. Additionally, an 
audit may also be designed to ensure the exercise of 
due diligence in fulfilling relevant legal obligations. 
It then becomes a tool to assess the risk of non-
compliance and to institute appropriate risk control 
measures.4  
A legal obligation is central to compliance and 
due diligence audits. By contrast, a performance 
 
environmental practices, and assessing compliance with company 
policies, which includes meeting regulatory requirements. Ruth 
Geldard, Environmental Auditing in Victoria: Private enterprise 
and public sector examples (Monash University LLM thesis, 
1995), p 1. 
3. The term has been used to cover a wide range of audit 
procedures, including: Performance Audits (see below), 
Environmental Management Systems Audits (see below), 
Registration Audits (that is, for certification under a management 
standard), Compliance Audits (see below), Site Audits (for 
example, Examination for contamination, etcetera), Prediction 
Audits (risks and trends), and Industry Audits (for example, 
mining, timber sector performance).  
4 Undertaking environmental audits to ensure exercise of due 
diligence can also provide a defence to some environmental 
offences, or be a mitigating factor in environmental prosecutions. 
Allen Allen and Hemsley Due Diligence a Guide for Directors 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors, Sydney, (no date)),  
p 20.  
audit is as broad as the objectives chosen by the 
organisation . Thus, a performance audit may 
examine, inter alia, whether the organisation is 
acting in compliance with all relevant legislation 
and how to manage the risk of non-compliance, as 
subsidiary matters to assessment of organisational 
environmental objectives. 5 
Performance auditing is probably a more 
appropriate and useful form of environmental audit 
for public sector needs. Although it is now usual for 
most arms of government to be bound to comply 
with environmental laws in the same way as private 
sector entities,6 it is not always the case that the 
crown is bound and that a compliance audit is 
appropriate.7 Further, the traditional responsibility 
of government for natural resources management, 
managed through policy setting, lends itself to 
assessment of the performance. 
The 4 “E”s of performance auditing 
Public sector performance auditing aims to 
determine whether an organisation is achieving its 
objectives effectively, efficiently and economically. 
These criteria are referred to as “The 3 ‘E’s” and 
have been defined as follows: 
• “Economy” is ‘the acquisition of the 
appropriate quality and quantity of financial, 
human and physical resources at the 
appropriate times and at the lowest cost (that is, 
spending less); 
• “Efficiency” is making sure that the maximum 
useful output is gained for any given set of 
financial, human or physical resource inputs, or 
is minimised for any given quantity and quality 
of output provided (that is, spending well); 
• “Effectiveness” is the achievement of the 
objectives or other intended results of 
programs, operations or activities (that is, 
spending wisely).8 
 
5 Neil Gunningham and James Prest, Environmental Audit as a 
Regulatory Strategy: Prospects and Reform 15 Sydney Law 
Review 492 [1993], 495.  
6 For example, Commonwealth of Australia Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 4.  
7 For example, the Royal Australian Navy is not bound to 
implement pollution control measures that are binding upon 
Australian merchant ships. 
8 Parliament of Victoria, Public Accounts and estimates 
Committee Issues Paper No 3 Environmental Auditing and 
Reporting (1998),  p 31. The Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) takes a slightly different approach, usually rolling 
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 A performance audit, per se, may concern any 
organisational objective, such as growth in market 
share. An environmental performance audit is a 
simply a performance audit concerned with the 
organisation’s environmental objectives. It is 
premised upon the organisation identifying one or 
more environmental objectives, which give rise to 
“model” or “best practice” performance criteria. If 
there are no policies, objectives and strategies it is 
very difficult to do a performance audit because 
there is nothing objective against which to assess 
performance. It is important to note that 
performance audits do not audit the appropriateness 
or adequacy of government policy. They cover 
merely the administration of existing policy.  
A fourth “E”, advocated by some environmental 
auditors, would be the regular, automatic inclusion 
of “environmental sustainability” in all 
organisational performance audits.9 It is premised 
on the principle that all organisations should have 
internalised some environmental objectives. Under 
current performance audit practice, however, 
environmental sustainability aspects are addressed 
only when an audit is specifically commissioned to 
examine them.  
Auditing performance against 
environmental management system 
targets 
Environmental management system (EMS) 
audits assess performance against targets set out in 
the EMS. Thus, EMS auditing is a sub-category of 
performance auditing. The International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) is negotiating a series of 
international standards for environmental 
management – the ISO 14000 standards series. 
These include an internationally accepted model for 
an EMS, identified as ISO 14001, adopted in 
1996.10 It requires that the organisation set itself 
 
together the efficiency and economy criteria and often also 
including an assurance element in many performance audit 
reports. (See text at note 52 below.) 
9 For example, Government of Canada Report of the 
Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development 
to the House of Commons 1997 (Ottawa 1997), p 16, para 55. 
The 4th “E” has been formally introduced into the work of some 
Auditors-General through legislative mandate. See Canada’s 
1997 amendment to the Auditor-General Act 1997, introducing            
s 7(2)(f), and the Australian Capital Territory’s 1997 amendment 
to the Auditor-General’s Act, introducing s 12(2).  
10 ISO, “ISO 14000 – Meet the Whole Family!” (ISO 1998) 
environmental goals, which are to be identified by 
the organisation. Although it does not prescribe 
goals, ISO 14001 does prescribe management 
processes essential to the achievement of those 
goals. They include undertaking an inventory and 
assessment of environmental aspects of an 
organisation’s operations, products and services; 
that employees be trained and competent to handle 
the environmental consequences of their work; and 
that an organisation commit to processes of 
continual environmental improvement.11  
 
EMS Pyramid12 
 Continual Improvement 
Management Review 
Auditing and Corrective Action 
Environmental Management Program 
Environmental Objectives & Targets 
Commitment  & Environmental 
Policy 
 
The EMS standard rests at the foundation of the 
structure of ISO 14000 standards that address, 
amongst other things, environmental labelling, life 
cycle assessment, certification and accreditation.13 
ISO 14010 is the adopted standard for General 
Principles on Environmental Auditing and its broad 
scope14 can encompass audit of governmental 
performance. The standard applies to all types of 
environmental auditing, not just EMS auditing. The 
audit criteria could be, for example, the 
governmental policies, practices, procedures or 
requirements against which the auditor compares 
collected audit evidence. The criteria are set by the 
“client”, which can be the governmental 
organisation that calls for the audit. It appears well 




available at ISO website http://www.iso.ch (accessed 21 
September 2000). 
11 Joseph Cascio, Woodside, Gayle and Mitchell, Philip ISO 
14000 Guide – The New International Environmental 
Management  Standards (McGraw Hill, New York 1996), Ch 2. 
For an organisation to register itself as having in place an EMS of 
international standing, it needs to be certified and registered as 
being in conformity with the requirements of ISO 14001. 
12 Ibid, p 37.  
13 ISO, op cit n 10. 
14 See the definition used, op cit n 2. 
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Public sector environmental audit 
Governmental auditing needs to be seen in the 
broader framework of tools for good public sector 
governance. It promotes public sector accountability 
to stakeholders for the proper performance of its 
responsibilities, including the integrity, efficiency 
and effectiveness of its performance. Stakeholders 
whom the public sector serves include ministers, 
parliament, the public and industry. 
Within this broader accountability framework, 
public sector environmental auditing assesses 
proper performance of responsibilities for 
environmental management. These management 
responsibilities, across the whole of government, 
can be conceived in three dimensions (see diagram):  
• along a horizontal environmental policy axis, 
including fundamental environmental policy 
formulation (for example greenhouse gas 
emissions abatement policy) and 
mainstreaming environmental responsibilities 
into other social policy sectors (for example 
mining, agriculture, tourism);  
• along another horizontal axis concerning 
internal resources management within 
departments, (for example, internal energy use 
efficiency, green codes for goods procurement 
and the use of waste processing systems); 
• along a vertical axis which concerns the public 
institution’s environmental management 
systems (for example. consultation processes, 
relevant quantified targets, trained personnel, 
executive responsibility, feedback processes). 
Public sector performance audits might address 
proper performance of one or more of these 
environmental management responsibilities. The 
simple way to identify those responsibilities that can 
be performance audited is to identify the 
performance commitments made by government 
itself. These include obligations under legislation, 
commitments for whole-of-government approaches 
articulated in published policy, and departmental or 
agency commitments set out in publicly accessible 
documents.15  
Contrasting environmental review 
 
15 See inventory of selected Commonwealth policies in 
Appendix III and the discussion of the National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development, op cit n 67 below. 
methodologies: state of environment 
reporting and environmental impact 
assessment 
Other methodologies for assessing public sector 
environmental performance are sometimes confused 
with that for public sector environmental 
performance audit. They are forms of environmental 
review but not performance audits. State of 
Environment (SOE) reporting, for example, is a 
form of public sector environmental review but it is 
not a performance audit. The Commonwealth Land 
and Water Resources Research and Development 
Commission (LWRRDC) is engaged in a process of 
reporting on the state of national soil, vegetation 
and water resources which it describes as a National 
Land and Water Resources Audit but it is not a 
performance audit.16 
Given that environmental management has 
traditionally been a public sector environmental 
function, SOE reporting does in fact reflect 
indirectly on the effectiveness of consecutive 
governments’ performance over time. However, 
SOE reporting focuses on scientific assessment, not 
performance assessment. Actual changes in 
environmental conditions may be caused by actions 
beyond the control of an incumbent government. 
Indeed, performance against public sector 
commitments, per se, is not directly or specifically 
assessed through SOE reporting. While the 
information in an SOER is essential to describe 
baselines and movement in environmental quality 
indicators, as well as to describe sources and 
dynamics of environmental change, it does not in 
itself assess the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness,  of  performance  of  identified  public  
 
16 The Land and Water Resources Audit is managed by the 
Land and Water Resources Research and Development 
Corporation over a four year program due to conclude in June 
2001 and is funded by the Natural Heritage Trust with a budget 
of A$30 million. It is intended to provide an objective national 
assessment of the extent of natural resource degradation to 
establish baselines for trends analysis, creating integrated 
nationally compatible data sets and links with the State of the 
Environment reporting process, indicators for sustainable 
development, etc. It is seeking to stitch together the various 
databases held by Commonwealth and State agencies to create a 
coherent whole.  See http://www.nlwra.gov.au (accessed 6 
October 2000). 








Diagram – Public sector environmental audit:  whole of government management responsibilities 
 
 
sector environmental commitments.17 
The usual methodology for analysis used for 
SOE reporting is the Pressure-State-Response 
model.18 This simply describes the state of the 
environment based on environmental quality 
indicators, in the context of pressures from human 
activities and responses by governments, enterprises 
and households. SOE reporting gives broad pictures 
of the environmental status quo in a continual 
process, necessary to formulate environmental 
commitments and to review them but, unlike 
environmental auditing, it is not premised on a 
commitments implementation process.  
An Environmental Impact Statement is another 
product of a public environmental assessment 
process that can be associated with, but does not 
 
17 The 1998 SOE report produced by the Western Australian 
government is unusual for its emphasis on identifying future 
environmental action. Although it is not a performance audit, it is 
explicitly linked to review of environmental policy and 
governmental response actions. See “State of the Environment” 
www.environ.wa.gov.au/DEP/soe (accessed 26 October 2000). 
18 Australia: State of the Environment 1996 (CSIRO, 
Melbourne 1996), pp 1-6. 
equate to, an audit. The Statement, produced 
through the environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
process, is required under law to be produced by an 
organisation as a prerequisite to its gaining project 
development approval or other permits.19 However, 
in relation to timing, EIA stands at the other end of 
the time continuum from environmental auditing. 
EIA is carried out before a new project is 
developed, to predict the future impact of the 
proposed action,20 whereas environmental auditing 
examines the actual environmental impact of those 
operations.21 Nevertheless, where an EIA results in 
conditions being set in a development approval, 
regular auditing can be used as a form of monitoring 
 
19 For example, Environment and Protection Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999, s 66. 
20 UNEP EIA Training Resource Manual; Monitoring, 
Implementing and Auditing (UNEP, 1997), pp 1-2, 5-6. Available 
at http://www.environment.gov.au/portfolio/epg/eianet/manual/ 
manuaI /topi c11.htm. 
21 Further, only two thirds of national auditing authorities 
around the world do not have a mandate to perform EIA. See 
INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing “Results 




to see what impacts do occur; to ensure that the 
anticipated impacts are maintained within the levels 
predicted; and to ensure that conditions of approval 
are adhered to.22  
Standards for public sector environmental audit 
In contrast with the standard methodologies for 
SOE reporting and EIA, or for annual public sector 
financial statements and audits,23 the methodology 
for public sector environmental statements and 
audits is not well established. Performance audits, in 
general, examine and assess resource use, 
information systems, delivery of outputs and 
outcomes including performance indicators, 
monitoring systems and legal and ethical 
compliance, in order to determine if an organisation 
is performing efficiently, economically and 
effectively.24 However, these procedures are not 
refined for the specific purposes of public sector 
environmental performance audits.  
For example, there is as yet no accepted 
international requirement that environmental 
performance audits, in either the public or private 
sector, include recommendations or follow up. A no 
frills audit might not include that task within the 
terms of reference and a performance auditor will 
not identify risks flowing from a failure to meet 
objectives, investigate their causes or describe 
remedies for failure, unless instructed to do so. Yet 
one might think that a public sector environmental 
performance audit ought always to do so.  
A further example is the lack of internationally 
accepted guidelines as to disclosure of public or 
private sector environmental audits. In the private 
sector, environmental audits are usually conducted 
only on a voluntary basis, are not reviewed by any 
government authority, may be subject to legal 
professional privilege, and are not usually disclosed 
for public scrutiny except in rare cases involving 
statutory or mandatory audits.25 Accordingly, ISO 
 
22 Indeed, the performance of EIA as an environmental 
management tool can be also audited to assess its effectiveness. 
See: Ralph C Buckley, Precision in Environmental Impact 
Prediction: First National Environmental Audit, Australia 
(CRES/ANU Press, Canberra 1989).  
23 The content of financial statements setting out internal 
corporate financial management by Commonwealth entities is far 
more clearly specified. (See: Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1997, s 55.)  
24 See generally, Johnson, op cit n 1, p 2. 
25 The audit has no force in law and is admissible in court only 
14010 standards do not require any communication 
of results to the public or to anyone other than the 
client.26 On good governance and public 
accountability grounds, however, audits carried out 
by public sector institutions should not confidential. 
Thus, under the Commonwealth Auditor-General 
Act 1997, public sector performance audits are made 
public. Similarly, EIA and SOE reporting processes 
are carried out for public benefit and are always 
open to public scrutiny.  
Australian experience in public sector 
environmental performance audit 
The diverse and complex roles of government 
and relatively long periods between elections 
prevent timely, specific and effective market 
feedback to government on its environmental 
performance. Therefore, it must generate its own 
feedback.27 Thus, governments can use 
environmental audits to test and improve their own 
environmental management, to design 
environmental policy and to respond to public 
concerns over specific environmental management 
issues.28  
Along the first horizontal axis of Commonwealth 
environmental management commitments there is a 
need for auditing against the performance criteria 
set in an increasing number of environmental 
policy, legislation and treaty commitments. National 
policies proliferated during the 1990s29 and their 
implementation is not widely or routinely subject to 
review.30 Many national commitments have been 
made at the international level through treaties and 
international action plans.31 Along the same axis, 
 
as evidence of “all due diligence” on the basis of voluntary 
disclosure by the defendant. See EPA Environmental Audit; Best 
Practice Environmental Management in Mining, (Cth of Aust., 
Canberra, 1996), p 8. 
26 Johnson, op cit n, p 254. 
27 Productivity Commission Report No 5 Implementation of 
Ecologically Sustainable Development Principles by 
Commonwealth Departments and Agencies  (Cth of Aust 1999),  
p 53. 
28 AIDAB Handbook for Environmental Audit Sector Report 
No 1 (1991), p 7. 
29 See Appendix III.  
30 Productivity Commission Report No 5, op cit n 27, p 57 and 
Table 4.2. 
31 Donald R Rothwell, “From the Franklin to Berlin: The 
Internationalisation of Australian Environmental Law and 
Policy” 17 Sydney Law Review 242. Although some treaty and 
action plan commitments incorporate international mechanisms 
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further obligations are contained in some 
Commonwealth legislation that binds the Crown.32 
Systematic review of implementation of these 
commitments at the national level is necessary to 
assess the effectiveness of any actions taken as well 
as for good domestic governance.  
Along the second horizontal axis lie 
environmental impacts of governments’ own 
internal resource use, such as paper, water and 
energy consumption, and waste output. These are of 
substantial consequence as government purchasing 
power and operations are a major influence upon the 
economy.33 There is a need for appropriate policies 
to be formulated and implemented to address 
governmental operations. One example of this is the 
Commonwealth’s 1997 Energy Policy.34  
But are there management systems in place to 
ensure proper formulation and implementation of 
such policies? Such audits take place only 
sporadically. Along the vertical axis of 
environmental management systems, Australia was 
externally assessed in 1997 by the international 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). As part of the cycle of 
national environmental performance reviews 
conducted of its members, the OECD report 
evaluated the general implementation of 
environmental policies.35 Findings included 
“significant potential” for improving effectiveness 
and efficiency. Most relevant for this article were 
the particular identification of inadequate coverage 
 
for implementation review, they are for the most part 
insubstantial, imposing little assessment at the national level. 
(See G Rose, “Non-Compliance in International Environmental 
Law” conference paper delivered at “Visits under International 
Law: Verification, Monitoring and Prevention” (23 and 24 
September 1999, Geneva, Switzerland) on file with author. 
32 For example, Environment Protection Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999, s 4. 
33 In the 1997-1998 financial year, Australian Commonwealth 
revenue was almost $136 billion and outlays $141 billion, or 25 
per cent of GDP. See Australia Now - A Statistical Profile - 
Government Finance at http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats 
(accessed 25 September 2000). 
34 Performance under this policy, which requires government 
agencies to meet energy efficiency targets, was  audited in 1999. 
See ANAO Energy Efficiency in Commonwealth Operations, 
Report No 47 1998-99 (Department of Industry, Science and 
Resources, and Australian Greenhouse Office) Table 4. 
35 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Australia 
(OECD Paris 1998). The report also examined integration of 
economic and environmental concerns and international 
cooperation in environment protection. 
and consistency in environmental monitoring and 
data, which weakens Australia’s ability to track 
environmental progress, to formulate cost-effective 
policies and to measure performance.36 The OECD 
recommended upgrading national efforts for 
collection and assessment of environmental data. 
Further, it found that the setting of quantifiable 
targets and timetables would be useful in this 
context, as well as the creation of appropriate 
institutional mechanisms, Federal cooperative 
mechanisms, peer reviews of the environmental 
performance of States and Territories and 
accelerated greening of government operations.37  
Commonwealth environmental reporting 
obligations 
The following discussion examines in more 
detail the extent to which internal institutional 
management systems along the vertical axis are now 
in place to ensure that Commonwealth 
environmental commitments are performed 
economically, efficiently and effectively. 
The Commonwealth Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 199938 (EPBC Act) 
came into force, for most parts, on 16 July 2000. 
Section 516A of the Act was inserted at a late stage 
into the Bill while it was under consideration in the 
Parliament, as indicated by both the numbering and 
the awkward text.39 It addresses the obligations of 
Commonwealth governmental bodies to deal with 
environmental matters in their annual reports. The 
new obligations apply to annual reports for the year 
ending 30 June 2001.40 The obligations apply to 
public service departments, Parliamentary 
departments, Commonwealth authorities and 
companies and to agencies established under 
 
36 Ibid, p 19. 
37 Ibid, p 28. 
38 Act No 91, 1999. 
39 Commonwealth parliamentary opposition views advocating 
that environmental auditing and State of Environment reporting 
should be included within the Act are set out in Appendix II. The 
government opposed both. It seems likely that s 516A on 
environmental auditing was inserted as part of a late deal with 
opposition parties to ensure passage of the Bill through the 
Senate. Requirements for State of Environment reporting are now 
also set out in the Act, at s 516B.  
40 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet “Requirements for 
Annual Reports”, s 14(1), at http://www.pmc.govt_index.html 
(accessed  27 September 2000) 
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Commonwealth law.41 The environmental content 
requirements for the annual reports are not clear. 
Section 516A(6) provides that annual reports must: 
(a) include a report on how the actions of, 
and the administration (if any) of [any 
Commonwealth] legislation by, the 
reporter during the period accorded with 
the principles of ecologically sustainable 
development; and 
(b) identify how the outcomes (if any) 
specified for the reporter in an 
Appropriations Act relating to the period 
contribute to ecologically sustainable 
development; and 
(c) document the effect of the reporter’s 
actions on the environment; and 
(d) identify any measures the reporter is 
taking to minimise the impact of actions 
by the reporter on the environment; and 
(e) identify the mechanisms (if any) for 
reviewing and increasing the 
effectiveness of those measures. 
These environmental content requirements can 
be considered as addressing the effects, both 
positive (paras (a) and (b)) and negative (paras (c), 
(d) and (e)) that the Commonwealth institution has 
on the environment. They can be interpreted as 
including commitments made under national and 
international environmental instruments. 
An action referred to under para 516A(6)(a) is 
defined in the legislation as including a project, 
development, undertaking or activity42 but excludes 
 
41 (1) The Secretary of a Department under the Public Service 
Act 1999 must ensure that a report under s 25 of that Act 
complies with subs (6).  (2) The relevant Presiding Officer in 
relation to a Parliamentary Department (as defined in s 9B of the 
Public Service Act 1922) must ensure that a report under that 
section complies with subs (6).  (3) The directors of a 
Commonwealth authority (as defined in the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Companies Act 1997) must ensure that an annual 
report relating to the authority prepared under that Act complies 
with subs (6).  (4) A Commonwealth company (as defined in the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997) that is a 
Commonwealth agency must ensure that the documents given to 
the responsible Minister (as defined in that Act) under s 36 of 
that Act include a report complying with subs (6).  (5)A 
Commonwealth agency that is: 
(a)  established by or under a law of the Commonwealth; and 
(b)  required by law to give the Minister responsible for it an 
annual report; and 
(c)  not described in subsection (3) or (4); 
must ensure that the annual report complies with subs (6).  
42 EPBC Act, s 523. 
the making of governmental decisions.43 The 
“principles of ecologically sustainable 
development” (ESD), referred to under paragraph 
516A(6)(a), are defined in the EPBC Act’s general 
list of definitions as having “a meaning affected by 
section 3A”.44 Section 3A provides: 
The following principles are principles of 
ecologically sustainable development: 
(a) decision-making processes should 
effectively integrate both long-term and 
short-term economic, environmental, 
social and equitable considerations; 
(b) if there are threats of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing measures 
to prevent environmental degradation; 
(c) the principle of inter-generational 
equity—that the present generation 
should ensure that the health, diversity 
and productivity of the environment is 
maintained or enhanced for the benefit of 
future generations; 
(d) the conservation of biological diversity 
and ecological integrity should be a 
fundamental consideration in decision-
making; 
(e) improved valuation, pricing and incentive 
mechanisms should be promoted.  
It is difficult to imagine how any Commonwealth 
body’s accordance with the ESD principles set out 
above might be demonstrated in the environmental 
sections of its annual reports. No quantified criteria 
or governance processes are prescribed. The 
principles are broad and general and render practical 
implementation of the reporting task either vastly 
unmanageable, or trivial and superficial. The ESD 
principles referred to in s 516A(6)(a) are not 
exhaustively defined in Art 3A.45 Article 528 
provides simply that the principles have a meaning 
“affected by Article 3A”, leaving open the 
possibility that the principles referred to in  s 
 
43 EPBC Act, s 524. Amendments to s 516A included in the 
Environmental Legislation Amendment Bill will broaden its 
scope beyond the limits of ss 523 and 524. 
44 EPBC Act, s 528. 
45 While the language used in Art 3A is arguably exclusive 
(expressio unius), it is not surely so as the Article refers generally 
to “principles” rather than using the definitive article for “the 
principles”.   
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516(6)(a) can be elaborated and specified through 
the use of guidelines, subsidiary legislation, or 
interpretation.  
Under Art 516A(6)(b), the outcomes specified for 
a budget allocated to a Commonwealth body under 
an Appropriations Act during the financial year 
reported on must be described in terms of the 
outcomes’ positive contribution to ESD. This 
provision on outcomes suffers also from the lack of 
specificity in criteria or processes inherent in the 
definition of sustainable development. 
Commonwealth bodies will be in need of guidelines 
for their reporting under this provision. The 
Department of Finance and Administration seems 
the appropriate body to develop benchmarks for 
reporting guidelines,46 in cooperation with the 
Department of Environment and Heritage. 
Paragraph (c) seems to require an inventory of 
retrospective environmental impacts, while para (d) 
seeks information as to measures currently in place 
to address those impacts. The relationship between 
paras (c) and (d) is ambiguous. All impacts should 
be described, irrespective of measures to minimise 
them, so that a comprehensive account can be 
obtained of the impacts and costs of addressing the 
impacts. On the other hand, it could be asserted that 
the inventory of effects described under (c) (for 
example, contamination of land) might need to 
cover only those effects not ameliorated under para 
(d) (for example, because a clean up has been 
conducted). The former interpretation is preferable 
to ensure transparency. Guidelines need to be 
prepared to clarify this point and to set out a 
checklist of impacts (for example, waste output 
streams, identified resources inputs or uses) and of 
ameliorative measures (for example, procurement 
codes, efficiency measures) to be described. In 
addition, comparable methodologies and units for 
their measurement (that is, core indicators) need to 
be defined. 
While most content requirements of s 516A(6) 
concern description of past actions taken, para (e) 
uniquely addresses future actions. It requires that 
annual reports identify mechanisms to review and 
increase the effectiveness of measures to minimise 
environmental impacts. This is in effect a 
requirement for Commonwealth bodies to develop 
 
46 As is the case in Canada, see text below accompanying 
footnote 125. 
processes of continuous environmental performance 
improvement, which is an important element of any 
standard environmental management system. Thus, 
s 516A(6)(e) obliquely introduces the requirement to 
develop an EMS. 
At the foot of EPBC Act s 516A(6) is the 
following cryptic note: 
“Note: The Auditor-General Act 1997 lets the 
Auditor-General audit a reporter’s compliance 
with these requirements.”  
In contrast to the discretion to audit 
environmental statements under s 516A, 
Commonwealth institution financial statements are 
subject to compulsory audit under the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997.47 The 
audited financial statements together with the 
Auditor-General’s assurance report thereon, are 
required to be included in the Annual Report of 
each governmental body.48 There is novel 
opportunity here for the Auditor-General to 
introduce a comparable system for annual audits of 
environmental performance statements, assisted for 
the first time by the data required to be provided by 
Commonwealth bodies.  
Despite the vagaries of s 516A, it is an enormous 
step forward for environmental performance 
auditing in the Australian public sector. Currently, 
detailed criteria and processes for environmental 
reporting in the form of guidelines are being 
developed by Environment Australia.49 No doubt, 
these will need to be refined through experience in 
their application. 
Functions of the Australian National Audit 
Office 
The role of the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO), as established under the Auditor-General 
Act 1997 (Commonwealth), is to assist the Auditor-
General in providing independent audit of public 
sector entities, including Commonwealth agencies, 
authorities and companies.50 ANAO fulfils this role 
by undertaking programs of audits of performance 
 
47 Financial Management and Accountability Act, s 56.  
48 Ibid, p 57. The audited financial statements must be prepared 
in accordance with the prescribed Finance Minister’s Orders. 
49 Personal interview, Andrew Major, Assistant Director, 
Intergovernmental Unit, International and Intergovernmental 
Branch, Environment Australia, 21 September 2000.  
50  Auditor-General Act 1997, ss 11, 12, 13. 
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and of financial statements.51 Chief executives are 
obliged to manage the affairs of their agencies in a 
way that promotes proper use of Commonwealth 
resources, where proper use means efficient, 
effective and ethical use.52 The Auditor-General has 
the mandate to undertake performance audits at his 
or her unfettered discretion53 in relation to 
Commonwealth bodies.54 Audits of environmental 
management are obviously within the mandate.55  
Across the decade 1990-1999, 24 audits of 
environmental relevance were conducted,56 
averaging approximately two or three each year. For 
example, of the 26 performance audit reports tabled 
by ANAO in the first half of 1999, one related to 
internal corporate environmental management by 
Commonwealth entities.57 These audits comprise 
approximately four per cent of ANAO audits 
produced, about equal to the average rate for 
environmental audits among performance audits 
conducted by national audit institutions globally.58  
Strategic planning for performance audits in 
2000-2001 is guided by six broad themes, 
considered by it to be important to the Parliament 
 
51 ANAO has two Services Groups: the Performance Audit 
Services Group and the Assurance Audit Services Group. 
General performance audits are mandated under Art 18 of the 
Auditor General Act 1997. See “Delivering an Integrated Audit 
Service” http://www.anao.gov.au/Auditstr.html (accessed 10 
August 1999).  
52 Financial Management and Accountability Act, s 44. The 
ANAO includes an ethical performance assessment component in 
all audits, although the identification of particular ethical criteria 
is difficult and can only be meaningfully related to conformity 
with the purpose of spending mandates. 
53  Auditor General Act 1997, s 8.  
54 Other than Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) or 
persons employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 
1984.  For wholly owned GBEs, performance audits may be 
undertaken by the Auditor-General where requested by the 
Minister, the Finance Minister or the Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts and Audit. This article does not examine whether these 
provisions of the Auditor General Act restrict the ANAO from 
undertaking environmental performance audits of Parliamentary 
Departments or Commonwealth Companies required to produce 
environmental reports under EPBC s 516A(2) and (4). 
55 The meaning of the “environment” is not limited in its normal 
meaning or in Commonwealth legislation to areas of national 
jurisdiction and, interestingly, the Auditor General’s mandate 
covers examination of acts outside Australia (Auditor-General 
Act 1997, s 4).  
56 See Appendix 1. 
57 See Appendix I. 
58 INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing 
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea 
(accessed 21 September 2000). 
and the wider Australian community. These do not 
explicitly address environmental performance.59 The 
ANAO does not as yet have a dedicated program of 
environmental performance auditing but addresses 
itself to environmental agencies or programs as the 
perceived need arises.60 Thus, subjects for audits are 
selected on the basis of a systematic assessment of 
the risks to the government program and the 
benefits an audit can provide.61 
As at the time of writing, ANAO is organised 
into two divisions, one for financial auditing and the 
other for performance auditing. There are 
approximately 100 staff members in the 
performance auditing division, within which eight 
branches are responsible for sectoral portfolios. A 
branch of 12 officers addresses a group of portfolios 
that includes an environment and heritage section of 
two to three officers.62 Although most 
environmental performance audits would focus on 
the environment and heritage portfolios, some 
environmental audits are addressed by personnel 
assigned to other portfolios, either as a specific 
issue or as one of a number of other issues. This 
level of resources would fall just below the middle 
of the one per cent to 10 per cent range of resources 
committed to environment related auditing by 
national audit institutions around the world.63 
Appendix I indicates the various portfolios 
addressed in environment related audits.  
Of course, the performance objectives in 
environmental policies and programs assessed are 
not confined to environmental ones. However, 
examination of the reports produced shows that the 
main focus of the environment audits tends to be on 
economy and efficiency, rather than effectiveness in 
 
59 The six themes are: Governance – Human Resource 
Management; Governance – Financial Management; Governance 
– Performance Information; Procurement and Contract 
Management; Information Technology; and Service Delivery. 
(Delivering an Integrated Audit Service 
http://www.anao.gov.au/Auditstr.html) 
60 Personal interview, Mr Michael Lewis, Executive Director, 
Performance Audit Services, 22 June 2000.  
61 In considering the risks and benefits, the ANAO examines the 
financial materiality, the significance of the program, the 
visibility of the program, as reflected in its political sensitivity or 
national importance, and the lack of recent audit coverage and 
internal or external review. 
62 Ibid.  
63 INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing 
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea 
(accessed 21 September 2000). 
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meeting environmental objectives.64 The reasons are 
essentially technical. Data for assessing economy 
and efficiency are more readily available and 
standard methodologies are clearly defined. In 
contrast, assessment of the effectiveness of 
environmental performance is hindered by 
methodological obstacles and data paucity. Often, 
environmental objectives are articulated in vague 
terms, obscuring criteria for assessment, and 
baseline data and ecological cause-effect 
relationships are unknown, making effectiveness 
difficult to measure.65 For example, in its report on 
Commonwealth Natural Resource Management and 
Environment Programs, the ANAO concluded that, 
although the government agencies concerned were 
constrained by poor baseline information and long 
lead times in achieving outcomes, their program 
objectives were too broad and unspecific to identify 
outcomes, their administration lacked committed 
focus on outcomes, and performance information 
collection was inadequate.66 
All indications are that some new, external 
impetus would be necessary for a more systematic 
and pervasive ANAO approach to environmental 
performance auditing. It remains to be seen whether 
EPBC Art 516A together with governmental 
commitment and public pressure might generate a 
focus on systematic auditing of Commonwealth 
environmental performance. 
Productivity Commission review 
The Productivity Commission is the 
Commonwealth Government’s principal review and 
advisory body on micro-economic policy.67 Under 
the Productivity Commission Act 1998, the 
Commission’s functions include holding 
 
64 See for example the reports on energy management and 
airport noise, Appendix I.  
65 INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing 
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea 
(accessed 21 September 2000). 
66 Audit Report No 36 1996-97. A mid-term review on the 
management of the $A1.5 billion Natural Heritage Trust drew 
similar conclusions. It was commissioned by the government 
from a variety of public and private sources and is comprised of 
28 separate reports and released in February 2000, see: 
www.nht.gov.au. 
67 Three bodies merged to form the Productivity Commission in 
1998. These were the Industry Commission, the Bureau of 
Industry Economics and the Economic Planning Advisory 
Commission. (See Productivity Commission Home page 
www.pc.gov.au (accessed 21 September 2000).) 
independent public inquiries and reporting on 
matters relating to industry and productivity.68 The 
Productivity Commission’s general policy 
guidelines require the Commission to ensure that 
industry develops in a way that is ecologically 
sustainable.69 Productivity can be interpreted to 
include optimal productivity of natural resources 
and the Productivity Commission has explicitly 
stated that “sound economic management requires 
sound environmental management”.70 The 
Commission therefore considers environmental and 
social aspects in all its activities and has produced 
several reports on environmental issues.  
Most relevant to the environmental performance 
auditing of government is the Commission’s report 
on Implementation of Ecologically Sustainable 
Development by Commonwealth Departments and 
Agencies.71 This was the first national 
environmental performance assessment conducted 
after the 1997 OECD72 report and it is the most 
comprehensive of Commonwealth performance 
evaluations. It focuses on how department and 
agencies implement ESD principles and “how they 
monitor, evaluate and report on implementation of 
ESD”. Less diplomatic and more specific than the 
OECD report, it produced a survey of selected 
departments’ and agencies’ approaches to 
incorporating ESD principles into decision- 
making.73 The report found that it is uncommon for 
ESD principles to be fully taken into account from 
the initial policy development stages right through 
to the monitoring and review of the policies and 
programs.74 It found that there were no legislated 
requirements for ESD monitoring, other than in 
relation to airports, although limited governmental 
ESD monitoring requirements are set out in some 
ESD policy instruments. A survey of actual 
 
68 Under s 6, these cover, inter alia, legislation or administrative 
action taken, or to be taken, by the Commonwealth, a State or 
Territory that affects or might affect the productivity 
performance of industry, industry development or the 
productivity performance of the economy as a whole.  
69 Productivity Commission Act, Pt 2, s 8.  
70 Productivity Commissioner Neil Byron and Barbara 
Arentino, “Sound economic management requires sound 
environmental management”, conference paper at National 
Environmental Law Association 18th Annual Conference (NELA, 
Canberra, 1999). 
71 Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 5 25 May 1999. 
72 Op cit n 35. 
73 Ibid, Table 4.1. 
74 Ibid, p 63. 
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monitoring and review of implementation75 found 
that these activities are not widely undertaken 
routinely and there are few examples where the 
results of monitoring are fed back into the policy or 
program.76  
The report made recommendations to improve 
frameworks and processes for monitoring and 
review, particularly over the longer term.77 These 
included departments and agencies regularly 
monitoring the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
ESD related policies, programs and regulations;78 
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics developing 
standard classifications and measurement protocols 
for collection of state of the environment data and 
sustainability indicators.79 It is significant that a 
jettisoned Draft Recommendation 7.5, suggesting 
that Commonwealth, State and Territory 
governments cooperate to facilitate performance 
measurement and comparisons of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of ESD programs, was deleted from 
the Final Report, no doubt because of the difficult 
political sensitivities associated with coordinating 
such action. Similarly, the Report canvassed 
adoption of new performance assessment 
mechanisms, and noted the relevance of a 
Commissioner for ESD in this respect, but failed to 
make any specific recommendations.80 The Report 
merely concluded that leadership is needed at the 
highest level and that the Prime Minister’s Science, 
Engineering and Innovation Council, which is 
chaired by the Prime Minister and includes key 
Cabinet Ministers, could consider reporting on a 
triennial basis “on matters relating to further 
implementation of ESD with a longer term strategic 
focus”.81  
This rather lame conclusion to an excellent study 
suggests apprehension of the political and 
institutional constraints that would confront 
 
75 Ibid, Table 4.2.  
76 Ibid, p 65. 
77 Ibid, Overview xvii.  
78 Ibid, Recommendation 7.4. It went on to require the 
development of performance indicators against clearly stated 
objectives established early in the policy development phase, 
using the framework of the National Land and Water Resources 
Audit in areas such as air quality, fisheries, chemicals and marine 
systems.   
79 Ibid, Recommendation 7.5.  
80 Ibid, Ch 8.  
81 Ibid, Recommendation 9.1. The draft report had dared no 
recommendation at all on this matter. 
proposals for improved accountability. The 
Commonwealth government usually makes a 
response to its Productivity Commission reports but, 
at the time of writing this article 18 months later, is 
yet to do so for that report. Nevertheless, the report 
provides a useful block for building institutions for 
better environmental performance accountability 
and EPBC Act s 516A might be seen as a partial 
response.  
Internal agency audits  
For this article, a survey of annual reports of 
Commonwealth departments and agencies engaged 
in activities with major sustainable development 
impacts was undertaken. It found that currently only 
two Commonwealth agencies systematically audit 
their performance in the context of environmental 
policy implementation and that no agencies report 
an overall environmental performance assessment.  
Australian Agency for International Development 
Australia’s Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) audits the field impacts of 
its development activities. It does not audit impacts 
of its corporate operations. AusAID incorporates 
into its operations explicit sustainable development 
objectives, which require:  
“the integration of economic, environmental and 
social considerations into the delivery of the 
development cooperation program ...  
(i) to enhance potential environmental 
benefits; 
(ii) to mitigate adverse effects; and 
(iii) to highlight projects where objectives may 
be seriously undermined by unsatisfactory 
environmental factors”.82 
The two mechanisms for achieving these 
objectives are environmental assessment83 and 
 
82 Australian Agency for International Development 
Environmental Assessment Guidelines for Australia's Aid 
Program, (AusAID, Canberra, 1996), p 5.  
83 Under EPBC Act s 160, the AusAID is required to refer 
actions that might entail significant environmental impacts to the 
Environment Minister for advice. Under s 164, actions are then 
assessed through the EIA process . Under the superseded 
Environment (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Commonwealth) a 
Record of Understanding with Environment Australia allowed, 
procedures operative under the Act to be applied flexibly, in 
deference to the laws of countries where the impacts are to take 
place. (AusAID Environmental Assessment Guidelines for 
Australia’s Aid Program (Canberra 1996), p7). 
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environmental audit procedures.  
In 1990 the federal government committed to an 
annual environmental audit and developed 
guidelines for environmental audit of its 
international development cooperation activities.84 It 
also adopted its “Ecologically Sustainable 
Development in International Development 
Cooperation: An Interim Policy Statement” in 
response to the Senate Committee on Environment, 
Recreation and the Arts report on “Environmental 
Impact of Development Assistance”.85  
Between 1991 and 1994, AusAID (then 
AIDAB)86 commissioned annual environment 
audits.87 All four audits involved consultants 
examining project documentation (that is, desk 
audits) to assess project environmental impacts and 
commenting on AusAID’s environmental 
assessment procedures. The 1994 audit included a 
field assessment of project impacts.  
Following the 1994 audit, the frequency of 
environmental audits was reduced to one every 
three years, with environmental cluster evaluations 
of projects in each of the intervening years.88 
Cluster evaluations involve a field assessment of 
impacts for a group of projects in a related sector, 
whereas the focus of an environmental audit is now 
a desk examination of environmental assessment 
and management systems. An environmental audit 
was conducted in 1999 (yet to be published) that 
reviewed the effectiveness of AusAID’s 1996 
“Environmental Assessment Guidelines for 
Australia’s Aid Program”.89  
It is evident that the content and form of 
AusAID’s internal environmental audit program is 
constantly changing. It evolved through the 1990s to 
better suit the organisation’s needs. Field audits of 
international operations are expensive and the main 
reason for scaling back seems to be resource 
limitation. While efforts to audit operations were 
 
84 Australian International Development Assistance Bureau 
(AIDAB) Sector Report No1 A Handbook for Environmental 
Audit (Canberra, 1991).  
85 Ibid. 
86 Australian International Development Assistance Bureau. 
87 AusAID 1994 Environment Audit of the Australian Overseas 
Aid Program (Canberra 1994), p 5. 
88 In accordance with AusAID’s acceptance of the 1994 report 
at recommendation 14. 
89 Personal interview, Tim Eldridge, Environmental Analyst, 
Rural Infrastructure and Environment, AusAID, 21 September 
2000. 
strong in the early 1990s, they may be faltering 10 
years later.  
Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
(AFMA) has statutory obligations90 to ensure that 
the exploitation of fisheries resources and any 
related activities are conducted in a manner 
consistent with the principles of ESD, with 
particular regard to the impact of fishing activities 
on non-target species and the marine environment.  
In its 1996 report on Commonwealth Fisheries 
Management, the ANAO severely criticised AFMA 
for failing to take appropriate steps to meet its 
statutory objectives.91 In relation to fisheries 
sustainability, the audit found that a lack of output 
based performance indicators (such as stock 
assessments) shielded the organisation from public 
accountability and that, in relation to environmental 
performance, its annual reports did ‘not provide an 
indication of its success in limiting fishing to 
ecologically sustainable levels’.92 Following the 
ANAO report, the Commonwealth Parliament 
commenced an inquiry into AFMA in 1996 and then 
tabled a report in 1997.93 The report was more 
sympathetic to AFMA than the ANAO and noted 
that AFMA was putting in place improved 
performance management measures.  
In fact, AFMA agreed with most of the ESD and 
performance accountability related 
recommendations in the ANAO report.94 It now 
includes an Environment Report and also reports 
against performance indicators in each of its Annual 
Reports, addressing its ESD obligations.95 These 
developments suggest that official audit and 
Parliamentary review procedures do promote 
tangible improvements in governmental agencies 
systems for management of their environmental 
performance. 
 
90 Fisheries Management Act 1991, s 3. 
91 Report No 32 1995-1996, Vol 1. 
92 Ibid, p 26-27. 
93 Commonwealth of Australia Managing Commonwealth 
Fisheries: The Last Frontier Standing Committee on Primary 
Industries Resources and Rural and Regional Affairs Report 
(Canberra 1997). 
94 Ibid, p 32, 36. 
95 For further follow up see David Nicholls and Tom Young 
‘Australian Fisheries Management and ESD - The One that Got 




Agriculture Fisheries and Forests Australia and 
Environment Australia 
Two other agencies which annually report on 
their environmental performance and have major 
sustainable development impacts are Agriculture 
Fisheries and Forests Australia (AFFA) and 
Environment Australia (EA). AFFA reports 
regularly against sustainability objectives for natural 
resources management, that it publishes in its 
annual report. However, the objectives lack specific 
performance criteria and the corresponding items 
are superficially reported.96 Environment Australia 
similarly reports annually against highly generalised 
objectives by providing descriptions of its activities 
but without evaluation against specific criteria.97 In 
neither case do the agency reports qualify as 
performance audits. It seems likely that assessments 
of their actual environmental performance could not 
be meaningfully performed against the objectives 
adopted. It is certain that, for these reasons at least, 
neither agency would bear up well under an external 
audit of their respective environmental performance 
management systems. Due to the central role of 
these agencies in formulation and implementation of 
Commonwealth environmental management 
policies, improvement in their management systems 
should be considered a priority. 
National Environment Protection Council 
Important to mention in the context of internal 
reviews for the effectiveness of environmental 
performance is the National Environment Protection 
Council (NEPC). NEPC produces an annual report, 
the first and only so far being for the year 1998-
1999. The report reviews the effectiveness of 
National Environment Protection Measures 
(NEPMs). Reviews of effectiveness are self-
executed by the governments of the participating 
jurisdictions (ie. all nine Australian governments) 
and are drawn together by the NEPC service 
corporation. Although they are not environmental 
performance audits based upon a standard 
performance cycle or environmental management 
system, the reviews do report against specific 
 
96 See 1998-1999 report, annual reports for AFFA are available 
at http://www.affa.gov.au 
97 See 1998-1999 report, annual reports for Environment 
Australia are available at http://www.ea.gov.au 
annual performance targets.98 The reviews are 
significant for indicating a trend towards reporting 
effectiveness of national environmental policies. 99 
Australian States and Territories 
Australian Capital Territory   
New steps are being taken to audit government 
environmental performance at the Australian State 
and Territory levels. The Commissioner for the 
Environment created in the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) in 1993 is currently the only office 
of its type in Australia. Under the Commissioner for 
the Environment Act 1993, the Commissioner is 
appointed by the Minister for a maximum of five 
years.100 The functions of the Commissioner are, in 
large part, to act as an environmental ombudsman 
and as a commissioner of inquiry.101 The 
Commissioner is also responsible for triennial ACT 
State of the Environment (SOE) reports.102 Akin to a 
performance audit, the SOE reports are to contain 
an evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of 
environmental management, including an 
assessment about the degree of ACT compliance 
with national Environmental Protection measures 
made by the National Environment Protection 
Council.103  
Agencies are to include in their annual reports 
details of: any requests by the Commissioner for 
assistance; any assistance provided in response; any 
investigation carried out by the Commissioner in 
respect of the agency; the Commissioner’s 
recommendations made following an investigation; 
and the agency’s follow-up to those 
recommendations.104 In addition, the Commissioner 
 
98 See NEPC Annual Report 1998-1999 at http://nepc.gov.au 
99 The Oceans Policy 1998 is also notable for its call for 
establishment of milestones for assessment and reporting on the 
effectiveness of the policy (Pt 2, Ch 6.1), although their quality 
and the robustness of the implementation assessment process 
remains to be seen.  
100 Article 5. 
101 Under s12 Commissioner is to investigate complaints and 
conduct investigations as directed by Minister. 
102 Section 19. 
103 Section 19(2)(b). 
104 Section 23. The principal officer of an agency shall include in 
the annual report of that agency:  
(a) details of any request under s 18 received by the agency; 
(b) details of any assistance provided in response to that request; 
(c) details of any investigation carried out by the Commissioner 
in respect of any activity of the agency; and 
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may undertake a special report initiated by the 
Commissioner or directed by the Minister. The 
Commissioner’s annual report is to include 
particulars of measures taken by the Territory to 
implement any recommendation in an SOE report or 
special report and particulars of any 
recommendation which the Commissioner believes 
is still to be fully implemented.105  
Thus, the broad mandate of the ACT 
Commissioner for the Environment focuses on the 
functions of Ombudsman, Commissioner of Inquiry 
and that of manager of SOE reporting. These 
include ACT public sector environmental 
performance auditing, especially with respect to 
NEPMs implementation and recommendations 
flowing from the Commissioner’s past reports. 
However, the substantial responsibilities of the 
Office of the Commissioner on paper are belied by 
its limited resources on the ground. It has the 
equivalent of two full time staff. Therefore, its 
activities are largely constrained to its function in 
State of the Environment reporting.  
Environmental auditing in the ACT also receives 
attention in the ACT Auditor-General Act 1996. It is 
unique in Australia in explicitly setting out the 
mandate of the Audit-General to incorporate the 
fourth “E”, for ecological sustainability, into the 
conduct of ACT public sector performance audits. 
Sustainability considerations are defined to include 
the implementation of the precautionary principle; 
inter-generational equity; conservation of biological 
diversity and ecological integrity; and improved 
valuation and pricing of environmental resources.106 
 
(d) details of any recommendation made by the Commissioner 
following an investigation of the activities of the agency; and  
(e) details of any action the agency has taken in respect of each 
recommendation. 
105 Article 20(b) and (c). 
106 Under s 12(1) of the Act, the Auditor General may at any 
time conduct a performance audit in respect of a department, 
Territory entity, joint venture or trust in which a Territory entity 
has a controlling interest. Under s 12(1), in the conduct of the 
performance audit, the Auditor General shall, where appropriate, 
take into account environmental issues relative to the operations 
being reviewed or examined, having regard to the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development. Article 12(3) goes on to 
define ecologically sustainable development as follows: 
“(3) In this section ‘ecologically sustainable development’ means 
the effective integration of economic and environmental 
considerations in decision-making processes achievable through 
implementation of the following principles: 
(a) the precautionary principle, namely, that if there is a threat of 
serious or irreversible environmental damage, a lack of full 
Despite the broad sweep of this requirement, the 
Auditor-General’s performance audits are to include 
sustainability considerations only “as appropriate”. 
This has been interpreted such that it is not 
appropriate to address the 4th “E” in all 
circumstances, (rather than that all audits should 
address the 4th “E” appropriately in each set of 
circumstances). An issues scoping study at the 
commencement of the audit process forms the basis 
for the auditor’s exercise of judgement as to 
appropriateness in each case.107 
The ACT Office of the Auditor-General 
comprises about 20 staff. Due to its limited 
resources it has not initiated any specifically 
environmental audits or undertaken assessment of 
implementation of the 4th “E” since the entry into 
force of the 1997 amending legislation.108 Thus, the 
steps taken in the ACT are novel and exciting but 
are less than they seem.  
Other jurisdictions   
An Office of the Commissioner for the 
Environment was established in 1987 in Victoria, 
within the Ministry for Planning and Environment, 
to produce SOE reports. It issued two, assessing 
Victoria’s inland waters (1988) and Victoria’s 
agriculture and the environment (1991). However, 
the Office and Commissioner positions were 
abolished in 1991, during a restructuring of the 
State’s institutions and a radical downsizing of its 
government.109  
A newly incumbent government is now acting to 
establish a Commissioner for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development.110 It has given its support 
 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation; 
(b) the inter-generational equity principle, namely, that the 
present generation should ensure that the health, diversity and 
productivity of the environment is maintained or enhanced for 
the benefit of future generations; 
(c) conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity; 
(d) improved valuation and pricing of environmental resources.” 
107 Personal interview, David Hughes, Office of Auditor-
General, Australian Capital Territory, 20 September 2000.  
108 Ibid. 
109 31st Report to Parliament Interim Report of the Inquiry in 
Environmental Accounting and Reporting; p 48. See 
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/paec (accessed 6 August 
2000). 
110 The role for a commissioner is being examined through the 
Victorian Parliament Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, 
to which the author gave evidence on 17 October 2000. 
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to implementation of public sector environmental 
reporting of public sector compliance with 
legislation but has given no assurances concerning 
compliance with its policy commitments.111 The 
establishment of the Commissioner is currently 
being considered through the Parliamentary Public 
Accounts and Estimates Committee112 which has 
produced an Interim Report (June 1999) and a 
follow-up Issues Paper (June 2000) for public 
consultation.113  
Although State of Environment reporting occurs 
on a triennial basis in New South Wales, an ad hoc 
approach has been taken to environmental 
performance auditing. For example, the NSW 
Environment Protection Agency oversees 
implementation of the Government Waste 
Reduction and Procurement Strategy (WRAP) and 
Action for Air Policy, while the Sustainable Energy 
Development Authority oversees Energy 
Management Policy targets. It is said that the Office 
of Auditor-General is developing a more systematic 
approach to government environmental performance 
auditing.114 
The foregoing survey of State and Territory 
jurisdictions is not comprehensive. However, it does 
indicate, that gradual movement towards improved 
systemic management of environmental 
performance is taking place in some Australian 
States and Territories.  
International experiences compared 
Canadian national model 
Canada has adopted a model for environmental 
auditing of governmental performance that looks 
good on paper and also has resources on the ground. 
The Auditor-General Act of Canada, as amended in 
 
111 Issues Paper No 4, June 2000 Follow Up Inquiry in 
Environmental Accounting and Reporting, p 81. 
112 For the terms of reference of the Follow Up Inquiry in 
Environmental Accounting and Reporting 
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/paec/ear_terms.htm (accessed 
6 August 2000). 
113 31st Report to Parliament Interim Report of the Inquiry in 
Environmental Accounting and Reporting; Issues Paper No 4 
June 2000 Follow Up Inquiry in Environmental Accounting and 
Reporting. See http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/paec (accessed 
6 August 2000). 
114 Personal interview, Peter Maganov, Manager, Environmental 
Reporting, NSW Environment Protection Authority, 18 October 
2000. 
1995 requires that the Auditor-General report where  
“money has been expended without due regard to 
the environmental effects of those 
expenditures.”115  
Thus, the hurdle before officers of the Auditor-
General is to acquire the necessary skills to ensure 
that the 4th “E” is systematically incorporated into 
all performance audits conducted by them. The 
“materiality” of environmental concerns, that is, 
scoping of the likely gravity of environmental 
implications in a given audit, are to be assessed in 
all cases. While this requires institutional 
adjustment, the development of an auditing culture 
which incorporates the 4th “E” has the full support 
of the Auditor-General himself.116  
The amended Auditor-General Act also requires 
that the Auditor-General appoint a senior officer to 
be called the Commissioner for the Environment 
and Sustainable Development.117 The 
Commissioner’s main task is sustainable 
development monitoring and reporting on the 
progress of major departments.118 The four main 
areas of responsibility are to:  
• monitor implementation of the institutional 
sustainable development strategies which the 
Act requires major departments and agencies to 
prepare;  
• produce audits and special studies on 
environmental and sustainable development 
issues;  
• handle and record progress on citizen petitions 
to the Commissioner regarding environmental 
concerns;119 and  
• report to the Canadian Parliament annually.120  
The Auditor-General of Canada had previously 
produced 42 performance audits relevant to 
 
115 RSC 1985, Ch A-17, as amended by Bill C-83, 1995, s 7(2)f. 
116 Personal interview, Denis Desautel, Auditor General, Canada 
21 January 1999.   
117 Auditor General Act, s 15(1). 
118 Ibid, s 21. 
119 Handling and recording of petitions requires merely that 
petitions received by the commissioner be recorded and passed to 
the appropriate minister within 15 days and acknowledged by the 
minister within 15 days. The minister then has 120 days to make 
a response. The Commissioner reports to Parliament on the rate 
of petition responses. 
120 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1997, 
para 45. All reports are available at the Commissioner’s website 
http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/domino/cesd_cedd.nsf/html/menu_e.ht
ml  
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environmental management.121 Three themes 
identified in the Commissioner’s review of these 42 
reports were (1) an implementation gap between the 
government’s stated objectives and its actual 
performance; (2) lack of coordination and 
integration across departmental mandates and 
political jurisdictions; and (3) inadequate 
performance review and provision of information on 
performance to Parliament. A work plan for the 
Commissioner focused on improving information 
and communications was designed to address these 
themes.122  
The Commissioner is located within the Office of 
the Auditor-General and has a staff of 
approximately 40 auditors and an annual budget of 
C$3 million. Audit teams previously dealing with 
Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada 
portfolios were folded into the Commissioner’s 
staff, in addition to specialised recruits.123 A three 
year forward cycle of audits and special studies 
enables a systematic and strategic approach to the 
task of national environmental performance 
auditing. The broad formal mandate and the funding 
of a Commissioner and staff to fulfil the 
environmental performance auditing task has lifted 
the profile of national sustainable development 
auditing within Canada and seems to provide a 
model for examination by comparable countries.  
Particularly innovative are the institutional 
sustainable development strategies required of 
major departments and agencies. The strategies are 
to set out the triennial environmental performance 
goals each department selects for itself. Twenty 
eight were tabled in Parliament in December 1997 
and first reported on to Parliament by the 
Commissioner in May 1998. The strategies were 
assessed by the Commissioner in accordance with a 
checklist of essentially procedural requirements. For 
example, a strategy was required to be designed 
following consultations with stakeholders, to set out 
relevant issues, to relate those issues to goals, to 
identify measurable goals, to indicate how the 
strategy would change what the department does, 
 
121 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1997, 
p B-1.  
122 Personal interview, Brian Emmett, Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development, Office of the 
Auditor General, Canada, 18 January 1999.  
123 Ibid.   
and how performance would be measured and 
reported. Substantively, they were to deal with both 
the agency’s policies and programs and with the 
management of its internal operations. In this 
context, Canada’s Guide to Green Government 
1995, Directions for Greening Government 
Operations 1995 and the Environmental 
Management System (EMS) Self Assessment Guide 
1994 were used to build a framework for reviewing 
strategies.124 However, selection of the substantive 
goals themselves remains a policy choice in which 
the Commissioner has no role.125  
The Commissioner’s May 1998 annual report 
found two fundamental weaknesses (among other 
problems) in the 1997 departmental strategies. 
These were a lack of measurable targets and a 
tendency to restate the status quo, rather than aim 
towards future progress.126 In response to the 
recommendations in the 1998 report, agencies 
presented revised strategies to the Canadian 
Parliament in March 1999. At the time of the 
Commissioner’s May 1999 annual report, the 
revised strategies had been in place for only three 
months and the part of the report concerned with 
them was partly about the consultative process 
leading to their formulation. It found that there was 
a high level of satisfaction among those consulted as 
to their involvement but shortcomings were also 
identified. These were due to limited feedback on 
how participants’ views were reflected in strategies, 
limited consultation and coordination among 
departments in the formulation of strategies 
affecting cross-sectoral matters, and limited 
involvement of senior management in the 
formulation process.127 The 2000 annual report 
 
124 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1997, 
para. 50. Note also that Canada’s Green Plan 1990 announced a 
Federal Environmental Stewardship Initiative that included a 
Code of Environmental Stewardship.  
125 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1998, 
Ch 1.  
126 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1998 
Ch 1.30. 
127 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1999, 
“Moving Up the Learning Curve – The Second Generation of 
Sustainable Development Strategies” Exhibit 7. To ensure 
engagement at senior levels it may be helpful to require that 
CEOs of Departments personally present their organisation’s 
Rose 
  
found that about 50 per cent of revised targets 
included a clearly stated criterion for measuring 
success and an expected completion date.128 
Departments and agencies report to Parliament 
on their own implementation of the their strategies 
annually in October, based on progress to 31 March. 
Implementation reports are based upon the 
Canadian Treasury Board Guideline for the 
Preparation of Departmental Performance Reports 
to Parliament.129 The first departmental and agency 
reports on their sustainable development strategies 
as revised in 1999 were delivered in October 1999 
and were addressed in the Commissioner’s May 
2000 report. The report focused on whether 
departments were doing what they said they would 
in their strategies and whether they had the 
capacities to implement their strategies.  
It found that the quality of information supplied 
fell well below requirements set out in the Treasury 
Board Guideline, but that it is improving overall. 
The Report assessed that about 20 per cent of the 
strategies’ commitments were being met, as 
compared to 11 per cent in 1999. In relation to 
departments’ and agencies’ capacities to implement 
their strategies, the report looked for the use of an 
EMS and took ISO 14001 as the benchmark. It 
found that half of the management practices 
identified in the ISO 14001 standard were being 
applied, as compared to a third in 1999. Capacity 
tended to be stronger in the earlier stage of the 
management cycle, concerning planning, and 
became progressively weaker in the later stages, in 
connection with checking corrective action and 
policy review.130  
In addition to implementation of sustainable 
development strategies, the Commissioner’s annual 
reports regularly address broader issues of whole-
of-government capacity for sustainable 
development, such as inter- and intra-governmental 
cooperation, integration of environmental 
considerations into policy decisions and 
environmentally sound internal operations. In 1998 
 
report on implementation of its sustainable development strategy 
to the Parliamentary Committee which examines them.  
128 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 2000, 
Chapter 1 “Implementing Sustainable Development Strategies: 
Year Two – Work in Progress”, para 1.5.  
129 Ibid, Exhibit 1.2. 
130 Ibid, para 1.40-1.55. 
the focus was on building of capacity in 
management techniques for sustainable 
development, including expanding the horizons for 
information input (for example, by inclusive 
consultation), improving environmental impact 
assessment information, adopting environmental 
management systems, and developing indicators for 
performance measurement131. In 1999, the focus 
was on federal-provincial environment cooperation 
agreements, organisational management systems 
and decisions-making.132 In 2000, cooperative 
partnerships within government, across government 
and with the private sector were addressed.133 
The reports also regularly address a selected 
sectoral special study. Special studies have covered 
climate change and biodiversity,134 toxic 
substances135 and smog.136  
Follow-up audits are conducted two years after 
an initial audit is reported, to examine for resolution 
of identified performance shortcomings. Following 
up on four previous audits (hazardous waste, ozone 
layer protection, biodiversity conservation, and 
environmental assessment, 1998-1999), the 
Commissioner’s 2000 report concluded that only 
five per cent of audit recommendations had been 
acted upon by government departments.137 
Interviews conducted by the author with 
Canadian officials indicated that officers of 
Environment Canada felt that their department is 
particularly challenged by the Commissioner. This 
is to be expected as Environment Canada is seen as 
the agency primarily responsible for the quality of 
the federal environmental performance. It is the 
department generating the most commitments and 
with the most to lose through exposure of poor 
implementation. Officials considered that the 
Commissioner did not appreciate departmental 
resource constraints, including its limited influence 
over whole-of-government performance. This 
concern has been picked up in the Commissioner’s 
annual reports, in the chapters on capacity building.  
 
131 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Representatives 1998, 
Chs 5-8.  
132 1999 Report Ch s 5-9.  
133 2000 Report Ch s 5-8.  
134 1998 Report Ch s 2-4.  
135 1999 Report Ch s 3-4). 
136 2000 Report Ch 4.  
137 2000 Report Ch 9. 
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Despite the slow turn around time in response to 
audit recommendations, it appears that the 
Commissioner is making a difference in 
governmental environmental performance. There 
are apparent positive departmental responses to the 
urging for adoption of EMS tools, such as 
meaningful performance targets and indicators. 
There is also, its seems for the first time anywhere, 
frank assessment of governmental performance and 
objective, authoritative critique of under-
performance. The legal requirement that each 
government department develop and adopt a 
sustainable development strategy necessitates the 
engagement of all government in environmental 
management. Integrated management between the 
different arms of government is promoted by 
consultation with stakeholders. The legal 
requirement that performance of each sustainable 
development strategy be audited and a report tabled 
in Parliament then ensures each department’s 
accountability for fulfilling its responsibilities under 
its strategy. These and other achievements foster 
better environmental management, improved 
implementation, and a culture of accountability. 
Canada seems to be developing world’s best 
practice in auditing of government environmental 
performance.  
New Zealand 
The powers of the Office of Auditor-General in 
New Zealand include environmental auditing. A 
few environmental performance audits have been 
produced,138 one of them jointly with the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
in New Zealand (PCE).139 The PCE, which 
commenced functioning in 1987, fulfils several 
roles, being an environmental ombudsman, auditor 
of aspects of government environmental 
management, and an environmental policy adviser 
to Parliament. Due to its novel nature, it is the 
Office of the PCE which warrants particular 
examination. 
Helen Hughes, a past Commissioner (1987-1996) 
has defined the purpose of the Office as being to 
provide “an independent check on the capability of 
 
138 For example, Regional Councils – Maintaining River 
Protection Works (1998); Administration of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 by Regional Councils (1996)  
(http://www.netlink.co.nz/~oag/Reports 6 September 1999). 
139 That is, Marine Fisheries Management (1990).  
the New Zealand system of environmental 
management and the performance of public 
authorities in maintaining and improving the quality 
of the environment”.140 The PCE audit function is 
set out in s 16(f) of the Environment Act 1986 and 
the major audit function originally expected of it 
concerned environmental impact assessments, as 
this was the role of the previous Commission for the 
Environment. However, the onerous responsibility 
for oversight of assessments shifted, first to the 
newly created Ministry of Environment under the 
Environment Act 1986 and then to local and 
regional authorities under the Resources 
Management Act 1991. Therefore, the role of the 
PCE as auditor of assessments withered after a 
transitional period. The PCE’s strategy in reviewing 
environmental assessments has been, instead, to 
establish independent review panels for particular 
assessments.  
Audits have addressed the overall environmental 
performance of two regional public authorities and a 
review has been conducted of the management of 
local and regional councils of their assessment 
responsibilities. However, fulfilment of the audit 
role of the PCE has been very limited. This seems 
due to the varied functions and limited capacity of 
the Office of PCE (which numbers 12 persons) and, 
to an extent, its overlap with the audit role of the 
New Zealand Auditor-General.  
The fluidity of the roles played by the PCE has 
allowed it also to conduct “reviews” acting as 
environmental policy adviser to Parliament, or 
“guardian of New Zealand’s system of 
environmental management”. These reviews of the 
existing system of policies are intended to identify 
gaps or shortcomings and are comparable to 
environmental audits in the sense of its management 
system audits described above.141 However, they do 
not amount to a process for systematic approach to 
review of governmental environmental 
performance. It would seem that the Canadian 
model better serves that role.  
 
140 PCE Annual Report 1993-4 (Wellington 1994) p 4.10, cited 
in Tom Buhrs, “Barking Up Which Trees? New Zealand’s 
Environmental Watchdog” in G Hawke, (ed) Guardians for the 
Environment (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington 1997),  p 
193. 
141 For example, it performed reviews concerning marine 
fisheries management, dry tussock grasslands, sustainable energy 
management and rabbit and possum pest management.  
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Future of Australian Commonwealth 
environmental auditing 
What lies in the future for implementation 
reviews of Commonwealth sustainable development 
policy? Auditing of its performance is obstructed by 
the lack of specific or quantified performance 
commitments against which policy implementation 
can be measured, and a lack of baseline data to 
relate meaningful performance commitments to.  
Concerning the need for improvement of 
information on baselines that specific performance 
commitments can be related to, the Productivity 
Commission and ANAO reports lay a great deal of 
hope at the door of the National Land and Water 
Resources Audit. National SOE reporting could also 
be useful here in providing better baseline 
information. Important steps to improve baseline 
information coherency are also being taken through 
the National Pollutant Inventory142 and at State and 
Territory levels, through the uptake of regular state 
of the environment reporting. 
While these will not gather the broader context 
of socio-economic data relevant to sustainable 
development, those data sets are addressed in part 
by the “sustainability indicators” being developed 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in association 
with the Australian and New Zealand Environment 
and Conservation Council (ANZECC).143 There is 
reason for modest confidence that those combined 
efforts could support development of a coherent 
national information set concerning the 
development of scientifically sound national 
baselines and indicators. 
In contrast, concerning specific or quantified 
Commonwealth government performance 
commitments in the field of sustainable 
development, there is still no significant movement 
forward (for either policy formulation and 
implementation, or internal resources inputs and 
outputs). Nevertheless, the strengthening of 
baselines and indicators, advocacy of private sector 
models of management and accountability and 
trends displayed in the AFMA and NEPM 
 
142 See the NEPC website at http://www.nepc.gov.au (accessed 
19 October 2000). 
143 See “National Headline Sustainability Indicators” on the 
themes/environment database of the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics at http//:www.abs.gov.au (accessed 24 September 
2000). 
effectiveness reporting process, may provide some 
ground for optimism as to future improvement in 
the quality of Commonwealth environmental 
performance commitments. It is likely that regular 
performance reporting will generate feedback for 
improved benchmarking of commitments. 
In relation to the development of Commonwealth 
agency internal environmental management 
systems, s 516A of the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 is timely. In 
requiring agency environmental reporting, it 
provides an opportunity to introduce systematic 
audit of agency environmental performance. But the 
Australian community would have been better 
served if the legislation had articulated clearer 
performance objectives to report against, explicitly 
requiring the formulation of agency targets. 
Currently, these need to be implied by working 
backward from the consequences of the reporting 
obligation. Only by implication of the requirement 
that agencies continuously improve their 
environmental management144 is there a requirement 
upon them to develop an environmental 
management system. No doubt this will become 
apparent after initial audits under s 516A are 
conducted.  
Australian Commissioner for the 
Environment 
Assuming that arguments gathered in this article 
persuade that there is a need for robust review of 
Commonwealth environmental performance, what 
institutional mechanism should be used to perform 
that review?  
The most tested and reliable mechanism is 
environmental audit, as performed by an 
independent authority. This could see the 
establishment of a specific ANAO mandate, such as 
an Office of the Environmental Auditor or a special 
Commissioner for ESD, along the lines of the 
Canadian model. The advantages of a special 
Auditor or Commissioner are that he or she would 
lift the profile and importance of Commonwealth 
environmental performance audit. In its dissenting 
recommendations in the Senate Report on the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Bill 1999, the Australian Labour Party 
called for the ANAO to perform environment audit 
 
144 See s 516A(6)(e). 
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functions.145 
If located outside the ANAO, the 
Auditor/Commissioner would be more vulnerable to 
budget cuts and political hostility than if located 
within the Auditor-General’s office, which is an 
institution with 100 years of respectable assurance 
of governmental responsibility and accountability. 
Within the Auditor-General’s office the 
Auditor/Commissioner also would have access to 
resources and expertise. In addition, location within 
the Auditor-General’s would promote the 
incorporation of the 4th “E” into the mainstream 
work of the ANAO.  
Had the EPBC Act also required the systematic 
conduct of agency performance audits this would 
have been helpful to ensure that agency reports are 
accurate and meaningful. In place of the current 
footnote to s 516A stating that agency 
environmental reports could be audited, among 
other consequential amendments following the Act, 
the Auditor-General Act 1997 could have enhanced 
the Auditor-General’s environmental performance 
audit function. Although the Australian Auditor-
General currently has implicit powers to conduct 
environmental audits, there is no specific mandate. 
The International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) Working Group on 
Environmental Auditing surveys has found that 
national audit institutions with an explicit 
environmental audit mandate complete 
proportionally more environmental audits and tend 
to be better resourced for the task.146 The ANAO 
currently has few resources with which to introduce 
a coherent program of environmental audits and 
may need to refine its expertise and 
methodologies.147  
On the other hand, location within the ANAO 
 
145 See Appendix II below. The Australian Labour Party has 
since made the creation of the office of Commissioner for the 
Environment part of its policy platform. See Sydney Morning 
Herald, 17 April 2000.  
146 INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing 
“Results of 1993 Survey” at http://www.rekenkamer.nl/ea 
(accessed 21 September 2000). 
147 For example, auditors would need to be familiar with the 
environmental context, including baseline conditions, database 
use, and sustainable development concerns. A systematic cycle of 
audits would be needed, preferably based upon the gravity of the 
risk being managed. INTOSAI also found that SAIs that 
conducted follow-up audits estimated the influence of their 
reports more favourably than those that did not follow-up. 
would limit the range of other environmental review 
tasks a Commissioner for ESD could appropriately 
undertake. The title of Commissioner is ambiguous 
and the job description can be broadly conceived. In 
addition to audit of environmental performance, the 
environmental review tasks which some might wish 
a Commissioner to undertake for government could 
include:  
• environmental ombudsman; 
• commissioner of public inquiry; 
• independent adviser on ESD policy; and 
• coordinator of state of environment reporting.  
These are not audit functions and would not be 
successfully located within the ANAO’s current 
mandate and structure. 
Calls by the Australian Democrats, Australian 
Greens and The Greens (WA) for the establishment 
of a Commissioner for the Environment are set out 
in their dissenting recommendations in the Senate 
report into the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Bill 1999.148 The 
Commissioner’s central function in each proposal 
appears to be environmental performance auditing. 
In its dissenting recommendation the Australian 
Labour Party called for the Auditor-General to 
undertake this task. Since then the proposal of the 
Australian Labour Party for a Commissioner for the 
Environment has been set out in its 2000 
environmental policy platform.149 The proposal is 
broad and hints at possibilities of multiple roles, 
including auditor, ombudsman, SOE reporter and 
government adviser. This policy would be likely to 
see the creation of a Commissioner responsible for a 
range of functions and located outside the ANAO. 
Related environmental review roles should be 
carried by bodies most suited to the appropriate 
function. The combining of diverse functions into 
one new institution outside the authority of the 
Auditor-General is likely to see the new institution’s 
environmental audit function minimised, as was 
 
148 See Appendix II.  
149 Chapter 31.8 of the ALP 2000 Policy Platform states that 
“Labor supports the establishment of a Commissioner for the 
Environment to provide objective, independent analysis and 
recommendations on environment and sustainable development; 
monitor and report on progress towards sustainable development; 
consider public complaints; and assist the Auditor General on 
matters related to environment and sustainable development 
issues”. See: 
http://www.alp.org.au/policy/platform2000/chapter_13.html#gree
ning (accessed 26 October 2000).  
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apparent in the ACT and New Zealand cases. Also 
likely would be conflicts between various 
environmental review roles within the one 
institution. For example, could a commissioner 
independently act as ombudsman in relation to 
outcomes from recommendations made by the 
Commissioner, or audit his/her own performance as 
ombudsman? Given too many roles is it probable 
that the proposed Commissioner would perform 
poorly overall and that some roles will atrophy.  
Therefore, an environmental ombudsman is most 
appropriately located within a properly resourced 
Federal ombudsman’s office.150 Public 
environmental performance auditing should be 
conducted through the Office of the Auditor-
General. Independent advice on ESD policy should 
come from an appropriately constituted Council on 
ESD, which is a non-governmental stakeholder 
representatives group.151 SOE reporting should be 
coordinated by independent experts, sitting on a 
steering committee with a statutory mandate. 
Synergies between these bodies could be promoted 
through structural linkages. For example, due to the 
major implications of SOE reporting for longer term 
ESD policy, the SOE steering committee could be 
chaired by the head of the ESD Council. It should 
also include a representative of the Environmental 
Auditor/Commissioner.152 Each of these bodies 
would be established more securely if they were 
given statutory authority.153  
Conclusions 
There is much legislation and policy in Australia 
 
150 The Commonwealth Ombudsman can presently address 
environmental complaints but has no specific environmental 
mandate and has few resources to share around. For general 
information see: www.comb.gov.au  
151 National councils on ESD have been established in  over 150 
countries (Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 5, 25 
May 1999, p 58.  
152 For the 1996 SOE national report, a 16 member SOE 
Advisory Council was formed, chaired by an independent expert. 
The Council included two government ex-officio members. See 
Commonwealth of Australia State of the Environment Australia 
1996 “The Reporting Process”(CSIRO, Melbourne 1996), pp x 
and 1.9.  
153 Public inquiries would be the exception, as these could be 
managed on an ad hoc basis in consultation with the 
Commissioner for the Environment and the ESD Council. The 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Act 1999, s 516B 
establishes, for the first time, a legislative basis for SOE 
reporting. 
articulating the objectives of sustainable 
development. However, two comprehensive reports, 
by the OECD and the Productivity Commission, 
have identified the need to establish policy 
implementation review mechanisms at the national 
level to systematically assess progress towards 
achievement of ESD objectives. Other than within 
the fisheries and overseas aid sectors, no 
Commonwealth management mechanisms were in 
place until the enactment of s 516A of the EPBC 
Act. The Act’s provisions are tentative and weak, 
leaving much for administrative clarification. 
The ANAO has a mandate to conduct audits of 
environmental performance. However, institutional 
obstacles at the national level to the use of 
performance auditing as the process for this review 
mechanism are described in ANAO reports, and are 
indicated in the Productivity Commission and 
OECD reports. They are lack of baseline data and 
lack of specific or quantified performance 
commitments against which policy implementation 
can be measured. In addition, there is no systematic 
approach to environmental performance auditing.  
Steps are being taken to gradually improve the 
data sets on which all performance measurement 
relies. However, Commonwealth performance 
commitments remain elusively vague and its 
agencies are not yet required to develop institutional 
targets. The AFMA experience suggests that, in a 
conducive statutory and operational context,154 
external environmental audit can assist reorientation 
of management systems to improve agency 
performance. Thus a program of environmental 
audit might assist the development of specific 
performance targets within institutional 
management systems.  
The ANAO is the appropriate home for a 
comprehensive program of environmental audits. It 
currently lacks adequate resources or a recognised 
mandate for that task. Establishing an Office of the 
Environmental Auditor, or a Commissioner for the 
Environment within the ANAO would be the most 
effective way to allocate the resources and establish 
the mandate for a Commonwealth environmental 
audit program. This would be a statutory position 
 
154 That is, under AFMA’s constitutive legislation, ESD is one of 
the organisation’s core objectives and the health status of the fish 
stocks it manages is readily measurable.   
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created under the Auditor-General Act 1997.  
Various other forms of environmental policy 
review would be better assigned to more appropriate 
bodies, such as a Federal Environmental 
Ombudsman, a national Council for ESD and a 
steering committee for ESD reporting. These forms 
of environmental review are extremely important 
and are inter-related. For example, it should be 
obvious that much, including performance auditing, 
relies upon adequate baseline data gathered through 
SOE reporting. The focus of this article on 
performance auditing is not intended to detract from 
them. It reflects only that environmental 
performance auditing has received attention in 
current public debate, that independent reviews of 
Australian implementation of ESD imply that it is 
much needed here, and that it is successfully being 
taken up in a similar federal setting in Canada.  
The urgent need for Australian Federal 
governmental accountability for environmental 
performance is a clear priority. Environmental 
auditing by an independent body would provide the 
system and machinery necessary. All that is needed 




Environmentally Relevant Performance Audits: 
Australian National Audit Office, 1990–1991 to 
1999-2000 (provided to the author by ANAO, 27 
June 2000) 
1999-2000 
• Commonwealth Electricity Procurement, 
Report No 25 1999-2000 (Australian 
Greenhouse Office, Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation, 
Department of Defence, and Department of 
Finance and Administration); 
• Weather Services in the Bureau of 
Meteorology, Report No 22 1999-2000 
(Department of the Environment and Heritage); 
and 
• Managing Pest and Disease Emergencies, 
Report No 9 1999-2000 (Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry – Australia). 
• 1998-99 
• Operations of Green Corps, Report No 42 
1998-99 (Department of Education, Training 
and Youth Affairs). 
• 1997-98 
• Preliminary Inquiries into the Natural Heritage 
Trust, Report No 42 1997-98 (Department of 
Environment); 
• Strategic and Operational Management of the 
National Registration Authority for 
Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals, Report 
No 26 1997-98; 
• Commonwealth Management of the Great 
Barrier Reef, Report No. 33 1997-98 (Great 
Barrier Marine Park Authority); and 
• Sydney Airport – Noise Amelioration Program, 
Report No 17 1997-98 (Department of 
Transport and Regional Development). 
• 1996-97 
• Commonwealth Natural Resource Management 
and Environment Programs: Australia’s Land, 
Water and Vegetation Resources, Report No. 
36 1996-97; 
• Maralinga Rehabilitation Project Tendering and 
Commercial Arrangements, Report No 18 
1996-97 (Department of Primary Industries and 
Energy); 
• Energy Management of Commonwealth 
Buildings, Report No. 10 1996-97 (Department 
of Primary Industries and Energy, Department 
of Administrative Services); and 
• Building Better Cities, Report No 9 1996-97 
(Department of Transport and Regional 
Development). 
• 1995-96 
• Environmental Management of Commonwealth 
Land: Site Contamination and Pollution 
Prevention, Report No 31 1995-96. 
• 1994-95 
• Energy Management in Defence, ANZAC Ship 
Project Contract Amendments, Overseas Visits 
by Defence Officers, National Landcare 
Program, Report No 29 1994-95; and 
• Is Australia ready to respond to a major oil 
spill?, Report No 9 1994-95 (Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority). 
• 1993-94 
• Rural Research and Development Program, 
Report No 38 1993-94 (Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy); and 
• Implementation of a New Program: Landcare 
and Environment Action Program (LEAP), 
Report No 34 1993-94 (Department of 
Employment, Education and Training). 
• 1992-93 
• Implementation of an Interim Greenhouse 
Response: Energy Management Programs, 
Report No 32 1992-93 (Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy); and 
• Living with our Decisions: Commonwealth 
Environmental Impact Assessment Processes, 
Report No 10 1992-93. 
• 1991-92 
• Energy Management of Commonwealth 
Buildings, Report No 47 1991-92; 
• Australian Quarantine Inspection Service – 
Quarantine Division, Report No 35 1991-92 
(Department of Primary Industries and Energy); 
and 
• Program Evaluation in the Departments of 
Social Security and Primary Industries and 
Energy, Report No 26 1991-92 (Department of 
Social Security, Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy). 
• 1990-91 
• Antarctic Supply Vessel – Chartering 
Arrangements, Report No 9 1990-91 
(Department of the Arts, Sport, the 
Environment, Tourism and Territories). 
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Senate Environment, Communications, 
Information Technology and the Arts Committee: 
Legislation Committee - Report on Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Bill 1998 
& Environmental Reform Consequential Provisions) 
Bill 1998 (27 April 1999), Chapter 5: General and 
Preliminary Matters  
Commissioner for the Environment 
5.14 A constituency for the creation of a 
commissioner for the environment was evident 
throughout the hearings of the Committee. [8] The 
concept derives from both overseas precedents in 
Canada and New Zealand and Australian precedents 
in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. [9] 
The suggestion was made that an office of 
Commissioner for the environment should be 
established.  
5.15 The various submissions suggest a range of 
possible roles for the proposed environmental 
commissioner. Principally, it appeared that the role 
of an environmental commissioner would consist of 
independent review of government environmental 
agencies and performance, including review of 
bilateral agreements, auditing of compliance with 
approvals and agreements made under the Bill and 
establishing whether the Commonwealth has met 
sustainable development strategies. [10] It could 
include the development of sustainable development 
strategies and assessment of whether the 
Commonwealth had met its obligations under such 
strategies. [11] In addition, the commissioner could 
be involved in the creation or coordination of 
periodic State of the Environment reports. [12]  
5.16 Mr Beale* did not consider that a 
Commissioner of the Environment would be an 
appropriate mechanism under the Bill:  
“It is a very bureaucratic approach. We have not 
seen the necessity to build such a role into the 
Bill. The Minister – and, serving the Minister, 
the Department – will, of course, have an 
obligation to monitor and evaluate, for example, 
State compliance with bilateral agreements. … I 
am going to have to report to the Parliament on 
 
* Roger Beale, Permanent Secretary, Environment Australia 
(ed note) 
  
that every year and no doubt be examined in 
relation to it. But it is not a case of setting up a 
separate bureaucratic arm for that. [13]” 
5.17 The Committee does not consider that it 
would be appropriate to establish a commissioner 
for the environment under this Bill. The Bill 
contains adequate safeguards to ensure 
accountability for the operation of bilateral 
agreements and of the Act, including review and 
reporting mechanisms. The Secretary is under an 
obligation to report to Parliament annually on the 
operation of the Bill and the report must be laid 
before both Houses of the Parliament. [14] The 
Auditor General will be able to conduct audits on 
matters related the implementation of the Bill under 
the Auditor General Act 1997.  
5.18 The Committee considers further that the 
suggested functions of the proposed environmental 
commissioner extend well beyond the scope of the 
Bill. For example, the development of sustainable 
development strategies by Commonwealth agencies 
and the coordination of State of the Environment 
reporting are much broader concepts than the Bill’s 
focus on environmental assessment and approvals 
and biodiversity conservation. The Committee 
considers that the underlying assumption that there 
needs to be a legislative basis for such processes as 
State of the Environment reporting is also 
questionable, as the current administrative basis for 
this is very successful. [15]  
5.19 The Committee does not consider this Bill 
to be the appropriate vehicle for the creation of what 
is essentially an independent statutory review body. 
To be effective, such a position would need its own 
legislative basis.  
Labour Senators’ Findings 
Labour Senators are of the view that there is a 
need to ... 
12. Provide for the Auditor General to fulfil 
environmental audit functions. 
Minority Report by the Australian Democrats 
Recommendation : That a Commissioner for the 
Environment be established as an independent 
authority to carry out functions such as reviewing 
bilateral agreements, monitoring State compliance 
with bilateral agreements and reviewing the 
performance of Commonwealth Departments and 
agencies in implementing their ESD strategies. 
Report by the Australian Greens and The 
Greens (WA) 
Recommendation : A Commissioner for the 
Rose 
  
Environment should be established as an 
independent authority to review the performance of 
the Commonwealth in fulfilling its environmental 
objectives and priorities. For example it would 
review the performance of Commonwealth 
departments and agencies in implementing their 
ESD strategies.  
Notes: 
[8] For example, Mr Gregory Rose, National 
Environmental Law Association, Proof Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 4 March 1999, p 115; Mr Simon 
Molesworth, Environment Institute of Australia, 
Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 March 
1999, p 302; Mr Michael Krockenberger, Australian 
Conservation Foundation, Proof Committee 
Hansard, Melbourne, 18 March 1999, p 281; 
Environmental Defender’s Office, Submission 15, 
pp 47-48.  
[9]  Mr Simon Molesworth, Environment 
Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
Melbourne, 18 March 1999, p 302; Environment 
Institute of Australia, Submission 623, p 5ff; Mr 
Gregory Rose, National Environmental Law 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4 
March 1999, p 115.  
[10] Mr Simon Molesworth, Environment 
Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
Melbourne, 18 March 1999, p 302; Environmental 
Defender’s Office, Submission 15, p 47; Mr 
Michael Krockenberger, Australian Conservation 
Foundation, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 
18 March 1999, p 281.  
[11]  Mr Gregory Rose, National Environmental 
Law Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 4 March 1999, p 115; Environmental 
Defender’s Office, Submission 15, p 47.  
 [12]  Mr Michael Krockenberger, Australian 
Conservation Foundation, Proof Committee 
Hansard, Melbourne 18 March 1999, p 281; 
Environmental Defender’s Office, Submission 15, p 
48; Mr Gregory Rose, National Environmental Law 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4 
March 1999, p 115; Environment Institute of 
Australia, Submission 623, p 3.  
[13]  Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4 
March 1999, p 175.  
[14]  Clause 516.  
[15]  The 1996 State of the Environment Report 
was produced by seven expert reference groups 
working under the broad discretion of the State of 
the Environment Advisory Council. 
 
Appendix III 
Inventory of Selected Commonwealth Policies 
on the Environment, categorised by sector. 
• Ecologically Sustainable Development 
• National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable 
Development 
• Local Agenda 21 
• Marine and Coastal 
• Australia’s Oceans Policy 
• Coastal and Marine Planning Program 
• Coasts and Clean Seas Program 
• Urban Stormwater Initiative 
• National Action Program to Combat Pollution 
of the Sea by Oil and other Noxious and 
Hazardous Substances 
• Marine Species Protection Program, 
• Fisheries Action Program 
• Forests 
• Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management 
Program 
• Regional Forests Agreements 
• 2020 Vision 
• National Forest Policy Statement 
• Land, Soil and Freshwater  
• Bushcare 
• Landcare 
• National Rivercare Initiative 
• National Wetlands Program 
• Wetlands Policy of the Commonwealth 
Government of Australia 
• Murray-Darling 2000  
• National Principles and Guidelines for 
Rangelands Management (under development) 
• National Water Conservation Strategy (under 
development) 
• Natural Heritag e Trust 
• Biodiversity 
• National Strategy for the Conservation of 
Australia’s Biological Diversity 
• National Strategy for the Conservation of 
Australian Species and Communities 
Threatened with Extinction 
• Atmosphere 
• Ozone Protection strategy 
• National Greenhouse Strategy 
• Greenhouse 21C 
• Greenhouse Challenge 
